This paper aims at analyzing the semantics and pragmatics of Persian modal verbs based on Papafragou's (1998 Papafragou's ( , 2000 relevance-theoretic model. Persian modals are defined in terms of logical relations and propositional domains. According to the findings of the research, two of the three modals, namely, šodan and tavăn express the logical relation of compatibility with respect to different propositional domains: the three forms mišavad, mišod and mišode are unspecified with respect to their propositional domains and take them directly from the context, whereas betavăn and bešavad accept the desirability domain. Mitavăn also expresses compatibility in relation to the propositions in the factual domain. However, băyad is the only modal that encodes the logical relation of entailment and is unspecified with respect to the type of propositional domain it accepts.
Introduction
Modality is basically concerned with the notions of possibility and necessity. In natural languages modality commonly reflects the speaker's subjective attitudes
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Based on Papafragou's Model 68 and opinions about the necessity and possibility of the truth of the proposition. Lyons (1977) and Huddleston & Pullum (2002) define modality along the following lines respectively:
[Modality refers to] … the speaker's opinion or attitude towards the proposition that the sentence expresses or the situation that the proposition describes.
Modality is centrally concerned with the speaker's attitude towards the factuality or actualization of the situation expressed by the rest of the clause.
Both of these definitions emphasize some of the most important notions involved in the definition of modality in natural languages, including subjectivity, proposition, speech act, factuality and modal kinds. They differ in the way they accommodate the two basic subtypes of modality in natural languages, i.e. epistemic and deontic: in the first definition "opinion" refers to epistemic modality and "attitude" refers to deontic modality, while in the second definition "factuality" refers to epistemic modality and "actualization" refers to deontic modality. Both of these definitions do not include the notions of possibility and necessity as the "core concepts in modality" (Huddleston & Pullum 2002) .
Linguists usually mention four kinds of modality: alethic, epistemic, deontic and dynamic. Some linguists, including Palmer (1986 Palmer ( , 1990 Palmer ( , 2003 and Huddleston & Pullum (2002) advocate a three-way distinction in natural language modal types recognizing epistemic, deontic and dynamic modalities, while others like Coates (1998) , Sweetser (1982 Sweetser ( , 1990 , Groefsema (1995) and Papafragou (2000) prefer a two-way distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic or root modality.
Alethic modality is related to the "logical or absolute necessity or possibility" (von Wright 1951) of the truth of propositions and has little place in natural languages. Epistemic modality is concerned with "the necessity or possibility of an inference drawn from available evidence" (Papafragou 2000: 3) . Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 178) define this type of modality as "the speaker's attitude to the factuality of past or present time situations". It is the modality of propositions (rather than actions) and expresses "judgments about the probability of the truth of the propositions" (Palmer 1990: 5) . Deontic modality is concerned with "the necessity and possibility of acts performed by morally responsible agents" (Lyons, 1977: 823) , or to use Huddleston & Pullum's words, it is concerned with "the speaker's attitude to the actualization of future situations". According to Papafragou (1998: 2) , dynamic modality is related to "cases where circumstances in the real world make possible or necessary the actualization of a state of affairs". In the following sentences the English modal verbs must, may, can, should and ought to exemplify these four types of modality, respectively:
(1) a. A triangle must have three sides. (Crystal 2003: 18) Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6.1 (2010): 67-116 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-010-0009-7 69
b. If Alfred is a bachelor, Alfred must be unmarried. (Lyons 1977: 788) c. A man may be older than his own uncle. (Kearns 2000: 53) (2) a. You must be Joseph. b. Something must be wrong with the thermostat. As the above examples show, the same set of lexical verbs in English is capable of expressing different kinds of modal meanings. This semantic feature of modal expressions, i.e. their ability to convey different modal senses in different contexts, is "widely acknowledged in the linguistic literature" and has "a robust crosslinguistic presence" (Papafragou 2000: 4) . Different descriptive approaches have been developed to provide a unified characterization of the systematic meaning multiplicity of English modal verbs. In the literature on modality there are three main approaches to the semantics of modals: ambiguity, polysemy and monosemy approaches. In this paper after reviewing some of the most important ambiguity/polysemy/monosemy-based approaches to modal semantics in English and the ambiguity-based analysis of these verbs in Persian and highlighting the inadequacies of these accounts, Papafragou's (1998 Papafragou's ( , 2000 relevance-theoretic semantic-pragmatic model which takes a unitary approach to modal semantics will be applied to Persian modal verbs.
Former studies
In the literature on modality there are three main views on the semantics of modals. Ambiguity-based treatments of modality assume "massive lexical ambiguity" in the lexical semantics of the modals: they assign to each modal verb "a particular cluster of distinct modalities" (Papafragou 2000: 22) and consider modal verbs as ambiguous between different (epistemic and root; deontic and dynamic) senses. The polysemy-based treatment of modal meanings as developed by Sweetser (1990) , argues for "a more systematic relation between the different Jalal Rahimian & Zohreh Vahedi The Semantic-Pragmatic Analysis of Persian Modal Verbs Based on Papafragou's Model 70 meanings of the modals" (Groefsema 1995: 58) compared to ambiguity-based treatments: on this view "the root and epistemic meanings are distinct" and "modals are ambiguous between a root and an epistemic sense", but "there is a regular metaphorical mapping between the two domains" (p. 58). On unitary or monosemous accounts of modality "modals have a single unitary meaning each" and "the apparent ambiguities are a result of the interpretation of an utterance containing the modal in a particular context " (p. 55) . In what follows these approaches will be exemplified and discussed.
Ambiguity-based approaches
2.1.1. Palmer's model Palmer (1990) developed an ambiguity-based treatment of modality by examining the semantics of modals along the two dimensions of kind and degree. Along the first dimension he distinguished between three modal kinds -epistemic, deontic and dynamic -and along the second dimension he distinguished between three degrees, i.e. possibility, necessity and a third unnamed degree to account for the epistemic and dynamic uses of will and the deontic use of shall. He arranged the modals based on these kinds and degrees in the following matrix (Palmer, 1990 : 37): But the range of modal subtypes he had to recognize, especially in the realm of dynamic modality, to account for the full range of meanings expressed by modal verbs is actually quite wide. For example, he argued that "there is yet another type of modality -neutral (or circumstantial), to indicate what is possible in the circumstances. [...] Neutral modality will, however, be treated as a subclass of dynamic modality, the other subclass being subject-oriented" (p. 37). Can, must and may can express this type of modality.
As Groefsema (1995: 55) observes, the problem with this approach and other ambiguity-based treatments of modality (including polysemy-based treatments) is that "even when more and more fine-grained categories of modality are distinguished, there seems to be no one-to-one correspondence between the kinds and degrees of modality that one can distinguish, and the different meanings of the modal verbs". This is due to the existence of intermediate cases such as indeterminate examples in which it is impossible in principle to decide between two distinct modal senses. For example, can on Palmer's model has three meanings (subject-oriented dynamic possibility or ability, circumstantial dynamic possibility and deontic possibility or permission). However, in (8) and (9) below it cannot be assigned any one of these senses; it is indeterminate between the two subtypes of dynamic modality, i.e. subject-oriented possibility (ability) and circumstantial dynamic possibility:
John can read Greek. (Palmer 1990: 199) (9) The people who cannot very easily raise their wages. (p. 85)
Sentence (8) can be paraphrased dynamically as "It is possible for John to read Greek", meaning that it is circumstantially possible for John to read Greek, for example because people know Greek. But it can also refer to John's ability and therefore the sentence is indeterminate between two dynamic senses of can. Similarly in (9) it is not possible to say whether the speaker is talking about the ability of the people to raise their wages or to their general circumstances. In the same way in (10) below can is indeterminate between deontic and dynamic possibility readings and in (11) must indicates some indeterminacy between neutral and deontic senses:
(10) You can be the first person to join our forces at such a young age. (Papafragou, 2000: 23) (11) If the ratepayers should be consulted, so too must the council tenants. (Palmer, 1990: 113) In addition to indeterminacy in the meaning of the modals when accounted for in such approaches, the proponents of ambiguity/polysemy-based treatments are forced to recognize cases in which different categories of modality merge completely. Merger occurs, according to Coates (1995: 61) , where "two meanings co-exist in a both/and relationship". To put it differently, "two readings are available for a given utterance, but instead of having to choose one meaning and discard the other (as with ambiguous examples), the hearer is able to process both meanings" (p. 61). For example, in (12) below deontic and dynamic possibility meanings merge and in (13), (14) and (15) epistemic and root modalities actually coincide:
(12) Stop that! You'll wake the whole building. Wally can't go any place at this hour - (Ehrman, 1966: 15 A: Well it ought to be at that price. (Coates, 1983: 17) (14) It is important to note that where high concentrations are theoretically possible in the plant evaporator, the time required to build them may be considerable. (Coates, 1983 ) (15) The quality of the final product must be influenced by the quality of the raw material, and the methods of processing may influence its nutritional quality. (Coates, 1983) The recognition of the phenomena of merger and indeterminacy "may be viewed as a threat to the overall validity of the ambiguity position" (Papafragou 2000: 25) as such examples actually show that in practice the so-called ambiguous modal verbs do not lend themselves to disambiguation (resist disambiguation) while " [o] n the view that modals are ambiguous between different meanings we would expect that they can be disambiguated in all cases" (Groefsema 1995: 57) . However, we saw that "there are cases in which it [straightforward disambiguation] is not possible, which leads to indeterminacy and merger" (p. 57).
Yet there is other criticism to be expressed against ambiguity/polysemy treatments. Proponents of monosemy-based approaches further criticize these views on the basis of another range of examples containing modal verbs which "do not fit any of the distinguished meanings, but which cannot be accounted for by calling them cases of indeterminacy or merger, either" (Groefsema 1995: 57) . In fact such examples demonstrate that "the proposed set of senses fails to capture the range of meanings which the modals contextually convey" (Papafragou 2000: 23) .
These examples are what Palmer (1990: 83) describes as "an 'extended', 'implicative' use" for can and analyses them in terms of four subcategories of senses, including offers and suggestions. Consider can in examples (16) -(17) (taken form Palmer, 1990: 86) and in examples (18) -(20) (taken form Walton, 1988: 103) and also consider must in (21) - (23) (Palmer 1986 (Palmer , 1990 ). In either case, "descriptive adequacy will be achieved only at the expense of a truly explanatory account of the semantics and pragmatics of the modals" (Papafragou 2000: 24) . Palmer rarely succeeds in providing a modal verb with just one sense as he is forced to rely solely on the limited context included in each modal utterance to provide the modal verb with its senses. This limited context forces Palmer to adopt an uncertain tone in many cases. In fact Palmer actually analyses modality in terms of modality, by talking about the probability and possibility of the truth of the senses he assigns to each modal verb. The following three extracts chosen from Palmer can illustrate this point. Note the frequency of the terms that indicate modality, ambiguity and indeterminacy in the arguments presented which have been underlined and are the direct result of paying little attention to the role of context: (I) When a modal verb is used to refer to the future with a simple form of the verb following it, there is often ambiguity between an epistemic and a deontic interpretation, or else a deontic interpretation is much more likely. Consider:
John may/might/must/should/will/would come tomorrow.
Only with might is an epistemic interpretation clear. With may either interpretation is possible ('It is possible that …' or 'I give permission for …'). With must a deontic interpretation is far more likely, unless the context clearly suggests an epistemic sense, while should is ambiguous. With will and would it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish an epistemic meaning from that of the will of futurity […] , or the interpretation may be in terms of dynamic will ('willing to'). (Palmer 1990: 66- Should only take three days for the survey report to be in to the building society. So he should be around sort of between half past two and half past three.
There are two examples with the word reason in them. It is difficult to decide whether this indicates a reason for conclusion (epistemic) or a reason for being (dynamic). The word reason can itself be interpreted either dynamically or epistemically:
There's no reason why it should be surprising. There is no reason why they should be simultaneous.
In these two, of course, should appears in the subordinate clause and it could be argued that this is not strictly comparable with other examples. There is, then, indeterminacy here between epistemic and dynamic modality. It is possible to understand why this is so: if we consider that it is reasonable for an act to take place, we may equally consider that it is reasonable to expect that it will. (Palmer 1990: 60-1) Sentences such as "it is not (at all) clear …", "there is ambiguity/indeterminacy …" and sentences that include modal terms such as could, probably, (un)likely, may and might are abundant (See e.g. pp. 55, 85, 108, 110, 124, 125, 126, 130, 179, 183, 184, 187) . What is obvious is that speakers and hearers do not get stuck in these modal calculations when trying to determine the meaning of a modal in a sentence. They actually do it in an instance.
Another range of examples which the proponents of ambiguity/polysemy-based treatments fail to deal with systematically includes modal utterances that have implicatures in addition to their explicatures. With respect to such sentences, Palmer (1990: 71) notes that " [c] uriously, [CAN and MAY are] often used to convey a command, often of a brusque or somewhat impolite kind" and adds that
[a]lthough a separate section has been devoted to this 'command' use of CAN and MAY, it is best seen not as an independent meaning of the verbs, but as an extended or implied meaning from the permission use […] . An expression of permission may be used to indicate that the speaker wants the action to be performed. But the fact that there are differences in the meaning of CAN and MAY here shows that the use has been conventionalized, and is not directly predictable from permission. (Palmer 1990: 72) Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6.1 (2010): 67-116 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-010-0009-7 75
On a relevance-theoretic semantic-pragmatic account, the modals in these sentences will have their usual sense (permission) at the level of explicature, and only when, based on the principle of optimal relevance, the hearer recovers the implicatures of these utterances the command sense becomes apparent. (1995: 72) Rahimian (1995: 104) assigned dynamic and deontic senses to mi-šod-Ø (as the past form of ŠOD-AN). He mentioned that dynamic mi-šod-Ø has two uses: "(a) expressing past time or (b) being used in moralized conditionals expressing counter-factuality in the present, past and future". The following examples (taken from Rahimian, 1995: 105) Rahimian suggests that deontic mi-šod-Ø in the following sentences "indicates a counterfactual situation in one of past, present and future times where the subject was deontically permitted to take the exam the next day" (p. Rahimian (1995: 106) argued that TAVÂN "is just used in impersonal constructions. It has only dynamic and deontic uses, which are the same as for ŠOD-AN. However, since deontic ŠOD-AN takes both impersonal and personal verbs, it has a wider use than TAVÂN". TAVÂN is used deontically in (40) and dynamically in (41) In this sentence it is not clear whether it is the cheapness of the dress which makes it possible for the buyer to buy the dress (circumstantial dynamic) or the speaker is willing to allow the hearer to buy the dress due to its low price (deontic). Also consider (43) as a case of merger in which both the deontic and dynamic senses of BÂYAD seem to co-exist:
Rahimian's analysis

Rahimian
(43) bâ ?in nomre-hâ to bâyad bištar dars be-xân-i ta with this grade-PL you MUST more lesson NIN-read.NPS-2SG until vâhed-hâ-yat râ pâss Ø-kon-i course-PL-you COMP passing NIN-do.NPS-2SG With these low grades you must study more so that you can pass the courses
Here studying more has been considered as necessary both in view of the bad educational status of the student addressed and the danger of failing the courses (i.e. dynamic bâyad) and also in view of speaker's preferences which can be considered to be the student's parent or teacher (i.e. deontic bâyad).
The following sentences exemplify the uncategorizable uses of modal verbs in Persian which cannot be accounted for on the basis of the cluster of meanings assigned to these verbs by Rahimian: (44) The above utterances represent the 'suggestion or offer use' of mi-šav-ad and mitavân which has not been predicted by Rahimian's matrix and must be accounted for separately as a special use of these verbs on this account. The existence of such examples which are not analyzable in terms of the cluster of modal senses as assigned to the Persian modal verbs can justify the attempt to apply new approaches to account for the semantics of these verbs in a more systematic way. Sweetser (1990) developed the polysemy-based treatment of modal verbs. Unlike traditional ambiguity-based treatments which analyze modal senses as distinct and unrelated, Sweetser (1990) believes that there is a systematic metaphorical relation between the distinct (root and epistemic) senses of the modals. According to her, "people generally use the language of the external world to apply to the internal mental world, which is metaphorically structured as parallel to that external world, and that this can account for the different meanings of the modals" (Groefsema, 1995: 58) . On Sweetser's model
Polysemy-based approach
[r]oot modals are taken to encode force-dynamic notions in the external world. For instance, may encodes the existence of a potential but absent barrier, must a positive compulsion, and can either a positive ability on the part of the doer, or some potential force/energy. These notions are extended metaphorically into the internal mental domain and give rise to epistemic meanings: may and must thus come to encode barriers or forces operating in the domain of reasoning. (Papafragou 2000: 26) Jalal Rahimian & Zohreh Vahedi The Semantic-Pragmatic Analysis of Persian Modal Verbs Based on Papafragou's Model 80 Papafragou (2000) compares sentences (47) and (48) below and their pragmatically enriched paraphrases given as (47') and (48') to exemplify the metaphorical mapping between the root and epistemic senses of may and explains that on Sweetser's model "it is the task of pragmatic interpretation processes to decide which of the two domains (root or epistemic) is the intended one, i.e. to resolve the structured polysemy in the modal semantics" (p. 27):
(47) You may spend this sum anyway you wish. (47') You are not barred (by some or other authority) from spending this money anyway you wish. (48) The butler may have committed the murder in the meantime. (48') I am not barred by my premises from the conclusion that the butler has committed the murder in the meantime. Groefsema (1995) and Papafragou (2000) offer several arguments against this approach. For example, Papafragou (2000: 27) argues that while in other examples of lexical polysemy in natural language the process of metaphorical mapping relates two independent and distinct senses, "[i]n the case of modals […] the senses allegedly linked through metaphor are not so distinct as the range of indeterminate examples […] has demonstrated". In fact as Groefsema (1995) also noted, indeterminate examples and cases of merger are problems that Sweetser's (1990) account, like that of Palmer's (1990) should face as treatments that consider modals to be ambiguous between root and epistemic senses. Papafragou (2000) further points out that the application of the proposal based on metaphorical mapping is limited in various ways: "an obvious case is positive can, which is not used epistemically. There is no motivation for this fact in Sweetser's account as she herself acknowledges (1990: 154)".
Monosemy-based approaches
In this section two main relevance-theoretic monosemous approaches to modality will be reviewed. One developed by Groefsema (1995) and the other by Papafragou (1998 Papafragou ( , 2000 . On these models "the failure of the proponents of polysemy view to account satisfactorily for cases of indeterminacy , merger, and uncategorizable uses of the modals justifies the attempt to explain the meanings of the modals in terms of basic meanings rather than in terms of ambiguity" (Groefsema 1995: 60) . The proponents of relevance-theoretic monosemy-based treatments assign unitary meanings to modals and account for the different meanings that modals actually convey in different contexts in terms of the interaction between the basic unitary semantics proposed for each modal verb and Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6.1 (2010): 67-116 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-010-0009-7 81 the assumptions available in the context of the modal utterance. It is the relevancetheoretic considerations that guide the hearer to recover the set of assumptions that bear on the specific meaning of the modal in context and enrich or develop the incomplete logical form produced by linguistic decoding processes into a complete propositional form. Groefsema (1995) assigned to each modal verb one basic meaning:
Groefsema's model
Can: p is compatible with the set of all propositions which have a bearing on p May:
There is at least some set of propositions such that p is compatible with it Must: p is entailed by the set of all propositions which have a bearing on p Should: There is at least some set of propositions such that p is entailed by it
The notion of bearing is developed actually to "focus the addressee's attention on all the EVIDENCE (of whatever nature, epistemic or otherwise) for the proposition expressed by the rest of the utterance" (pp. 62-3) or in other words, to focus the addressee's attention on the set of propositions from which p follows or on which p is dependent. The set of assumptions that have a bearing on p are actually supplied pragmatically during the interpretation process. Groefsema (1995) This logical form "focuses the addressee's attention on the set of all propositions that have a bearing on p, such as that the painters have the ability to paint, that the doors are ready for painting, that painting the doors will not interfere with the other jobs that have to be done, that the paint and brushes are ready, etc. This, then, gives us the intuitive interpretation of (49b) as expressing that it is possible for the painters to paint the doors today" (p. 64). It may also gain relevance by interacting with other contextually available assumptions and producing contextual implications.
Papafragou (2000) considers Groefsema's account as a step forward in modality studies and emphasizes that she agrees with a lot of individual points in this analysis, especially with the bare modal semantics, yet there are a number of arguments which Papafragou has developed against the details of this account.
Firstly, Papafragou argues that the crucial notion of bearing especially negative bearing, is "artificial when one considers how modals are actually used in communication" (p. 37); when producing or interpreting modal utterances, speakers and hearers do not really reason along the following lines as is suggested by Groefsema's (1995) hook onto something intuitively closer to modal meaning" (p. 38) than their formal artificial counterparts as primarily defined by Groefsema. Secondly, Papafragou (2000: 38-9 ) rejects Groefsema's belief that "only on some occasions is the hearer justified in looking for the specific propositions that have a bearing on p" and argues that "the hearer has to recover at least a broad specification of the sort of propositions that have a bearing on p, so that he can retrieve one or other type of modal interpretation". Take the following example:
(50) Sue may like to have this one. (Groefsema, 1995: 68) According to Groefsema (1995) , if Ann utters (50) to Bruce in a context in which they are looking through a pile of books they want to get rid of, recovering the basic meaning of the modal is relevant enough for Bruce on its own right and if Bruce trusts Ann he does not need to recover the exact set of assumptions Ann has in mind about what Sue likes. But Papafragou (2000: 38) argues that even in such cases "the hearer had to compute the type of evidence (i.e. epistemic), even though not the individual assumptions, which the communicator entertained and used as grounds for her utterance".
In the next part Papafragou's (1998 Papafragou's ( , 2000 approach to modality which is another relevance-based account will be shortly discussed. As a monosemy-based account, it must be included in the present subsection, i.e. 2.3, which deals with monosemy-based approaches. But for a better presentation of the model and its many parts and subparts, we will devote a separate subsection to it and analyze it as 2.4.
Papafragou's model
The discussion of Papafragou's (1998 Papafragou's ( , 2000 model will be presented in four parts: firstly, the notions of the descriptive and interpretive use of propositions as developed in relevance theory will be presented on which Papafragou (1998 Papafragou ( , 2000 has built her notion of propositional domains and her metarepresentational hypothesis; secondly, Papafragou's (1998 Papafragou's ( , 2000 propositional domains will be discussed in details; thirdly, the semantics and finally, the pragmatics of modal verbs will be offered. Sperber & Wilson (1995: 228) Any representation with a propositional form, and in particular any utterance, can be used to represent things in two different ways. It can represent some state of affairs in virtue of its propositional form being true of that state of affairs; in this case we will say that the representation is a description, or it is used descriptively. Or it can represent some other representation which also has a propositional form -a thought, for instance -in virtue of a resemblance between the two propositional forms; in this case we will say the first representation is an interpretation of the second, or that it is used interpretively. Papafragou (2000: 68) explains that "depending on their semantic content, propositional-attitude and other predicates pick out a specific use of the propositions under their scope". Consider (51) and (52) below; in the former thatclause has a descriptive use and in the latter it has an interpretive use:
Descriptive and interpretive use of propositions in relevance theory
(51) That the cabinet is corrupt is very sad. (52) That the cabinet is corrupt is unfounded. (Papafragou 2000: 68) These different assumptions are processed and stored in the mind in different ways. Sperber & Wilson (1995: 73) consider the direct descriptions of actual and desirable state of affairs in the external world as "basic factual assumptions" and argue that they are stored in their own "pre-wired" memory stores or domains in the mind directly. On the other hand, the propositions used interpretively are not treated as basic; rather they are treated as second-order representations of representations and are embedded under propositional attitudes. Sperber & Wilson (1995: 74) explain that "the language of thought acts as its own metalanguage" and humans are "capable not only of entertaining assumptions but also of thinking about them and about other representations". Papafragou (2000: 42) argues that "propositions are organized in domains". She distinguishes between various propositional domains. On the one hand, she makes a distinction between factual and various non-factual domains. 
Propositional domains as modal restrictors
Factual and non-factual domains
As was mentioned before, factual/non-factual domains contain truth-conditional descriptions of state of affairs in external worlds. These domains are in fact a case of the descriptive use of propositions as developed in relevance theory. What is called the factual domain is more precisely "a truth-functional representation of state of affairs in the actual world"; this domain is "the means whereby we represent reality to ourselves […, and it forms] the default (or base) type of assumption for the purposes of communication […] against which ostensive stimuli are processed" (p. 41). In this domain some factual assumptions are descriptions of "wide-ranging, empirical generalizations about classes of objects and events [… while others are] specific factual propositions concerning instances of events or particular individuals at given temporal and spatial locations" (p. 41).
The regulatory domains include "more constrained systems of laws, regulations or rules" such as the legal, social and religious rules or the rules of chess, laws of biology or chemistry, etc. Similar to these are the normative or stereotypical domains which store representations of norms or state of affairs in stereotypical worlds; this type of domain "relies quite heavily on the sort of structured knowledge humans typically possess about the normal course of events which has been referred to by various writers in cognitive psychology as 'scripts', 'frames', 'scenarios', and so on" (p. 62). In other words, the normative domains are "those by which we regulate reality" (Traugott 2003: 662) to ourselves. The representations of state of affairs in ideal worlds form the ideal domains; it includes representations of morally recommended state of affairs. Desirability domains include "descriptions of states of affairs in worlds desirable from someone or other's point of view (Papafragou 2000: 42) . On Papafargou's (1998 Papafargou's ( , 2000 model, root modal interpretations involve propositional forms used descriptively: the complement of the verb or the proposition embedded under the modal in the root interpretation of the verbs are used as "a truth-conditional description of a state of affairs in the external world" (p. 70). To put it differently, in root modal interpretations "the modality operates over propositions handled as truth-conditional descriptions of state of affairs (in the actual, or in an alternative -ideal, stereotypical, etc. -world" (p. 70). As will be discussed in the next section this is in sharp contrast to what epistemic operators do.
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Metarepresentation hypothesis
As was explained before, second-order propositional representations of other conceptual representations come out as a separate propositional domain. These are in fact a case of what relevance theory calls the interpretative use of propositions. As humans we are capable of thinking about our mental contents and distinguishing between our 'basic' and 'second-order' propositional representations and the interpretive use of propositions (e.g. metarepresentations) relies on just this human ability, i.e. the "ability to entertain and manipulate second-order representation in the language of thought" (Papafragou 2000: 69) . Papafragou (2000: 69) distinguishes between three separate specialized systems of metarepresentation or three separate sub-types of interpretive use: the metacommunicative system deals with "representations of utterances, i.e. linguistically communicated propositional forms, originally produced by the speaker (or another source) at a different time"; the metalogical system is concerned with "checking representations for logical consistency, detecting contradictions, and (in more advanced forms) judging a line of argument as valid or undecidable, …"; the metacognitive system deals with "representations of mental states, such as beliefs and desires, and with the human capacity for reflecting on mental states, either one's own or the projected mental states of someone else". On Papafragou's model epistemic modal interpretations involve propositional forms used interpretively or more specifically, propositional forms used metacognitively: the complement of the verb or the proposition embedded under the modal in the epistemic interpretations of the modals are used as "a representation of an abstract hypothesis, which is considered to be compatible with/entailed by the speaker's set of beliefs" (p. 70). To put it differently, "epistemic operators take scope over propositions which are entertained and manipulated qua propositions by the speaker" (p. 70). "The proposal to treat modal verbs in their epistemic interpretations as metarepresentational operators" (p. 205) is called the metarepresentation hypothesis by Papafragou (2000) and she considers this to be the core of her proposal.
In the following section the semantics of modals as proposed by Papafragou (1998 Papafragou ( , 2000 will be offered. Papafragou (2000: 84) Papafragou assigns different types of semantic underdeterminacy to modals: on the one hand, she analyzes can, should and ought to as cases of semantically complete, albeit vague, lexical items which may undergo free pragmatic enrichment to yield the specific interpretations modal verbs receive in context as well as the truth-evaluable representation expressed by the modal utterance. In fact, the semantic representations of these verbs are complete, but they may only need to be enriched by narrowing down their semantically specified restrictors contextually. On the other hand, must and may are analyzed as cases of semantically incomplete lexical items as they contain a gap or slot in their semantic content; they are unspecified with respect to the type of domain they admit in context. This gap needs to filled in or completed contextually; these verbs are dependent on on-line processes of pragmatic saturation to yield truth-evaluable propositions of modal utterances. In the next section it will be demonstrated how the proposed semantics, the metarepresentation hypothesis and pragmatic (relevance-theoretic) considerations interact to give rise to different modal concepts in different contexts.
Papafragou's semantic model
Pragmatics of root and epistemic modalities
The pragmatics of modality is basically concerned with the recovery of specific modal restrictors in specific contexts in order to enrich or complete the vague or incomplete semantic content of the modal verbs and develop the logical form underlying modal utterances into complete propositional representations. It is the principle of relevance which guides and controls the search for the domain which the speaker could have intended to be optimally relevant for the addressee.
To recover the intended modal restrictor (i.e. the set of background assumptions against which the modal interpretations can be understood) the hearer has to rely on "assumptions which are easily accessible from the encyclopedic entries of the concepts in the complement propositions and other assumptions which are contextually available" (Papafragou 2000: 49) . In accordance with the principle of relevance "the intended (sub)domain for the comprehension of a modal has to contribute to an interpretation of the utterance which is accessible enough for the hearer, and capable of achieving adequate cognitive effects in a way compatible with the speaker's abilities and preferences (i.e. an optimally relevant interpretation)" (p. 49). In two separate sub-sections the pragmatics of root and
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Pragmatics of root modality
It was explained that root modal interpretations on Papafragou's model involve the descriptive use of propositions. In different terms, root modal operators take scope over propositional forms used descriptively and convey that they are compatible with/entailed by the sets of assumptions in various semantically and/or pragmatically (relevance-theoretically) recoverable factual/non-factual domains. In the different modal utterances exemplified below it will be shown how the semantic inputs of different English modal verbs are pragmatically processed, i.e. enriched or completed, to yield the variety of the root interpretations that these verbs receive in different contexts.
Based on the vague semantics assigned to CAN, a (sub)domain of factual assumptions available in the context is involved in the interpretations of this verb in different contexts and can basically conveys that the embedded proposition is compatible with the set of propositions in that (sub)domain. Consider (53) below which corresponds to the logical form given as (53'):
(53) Computer-aided instruction can co-occur with more traditional methods of teaching. (53') p[Computer-aided instruction co-occurs with more traditional methods of teaching] is compatible with D factual. (Papafragou, 2000: 48) Imagine that (53) is produced in a context in which the interlocutors are discussing the changes brought about in society due to technological advances. The intended domain for understanding the meaning of can in this utterance is the domain of factual assumptions concerning technological advances and can in this context conveys that the proposition p[Computer-aided instruction co-occurs with more traditional methods of teaching] is compatible with the state of affairs in the actual world brought about by technological advances; "in view of the role of technology in changing societies, computer-aided instruction can co-occur with more traditional methods of teaching". If the interlocutors were rather discussing the views of teachers about the co-occurrence of traditional and modern methods of teaching, the intended factual sub-domain would contain assumptions concerning the views of teachers and (53) could be paraphrased as (54) Papafragou (2000: 53) suggests that "ability interpretations for can arise whenever the sub-domain of factual assumptions which is taken to be compatible with the embedded proposition belongs to the 'file' for an individual or object". Thus, in the case of (55) above the hearer will activate assumptions included in the encyclopedic entry for Mary (i.e. the sub-domain of factual assumptions which includes Mary's properties) and the utterance actually conveys the information that the proposition p[Mary speaks German] which involves a new attribute of Mary is compatible with her other features. Now take (56), (57) and (58) According to Papafragou (2000: 54) this type of interpretation occurs in contexts in which the following background assumptions are mutually manifest to the interlocutors: "(i) the embedded proposition p represents a state of affairs which is manifestly desirable to the hearer from his point of view as well as beneficial to him; (ii) the speaker has the responsibility for bringing about the state of affairs described in p; (iii) the speaker manifestly lacks any obligation to bring about this state of affairs". Here can conveys that the state of affairs expressed by p is compatible with the set of assumptions concerning the speaker's sub-set of desires.
The deontic (permission) readings of can/may arise in contexts in which the following contextual assumptions are present: "(i) the proposition p expressed by the embedded clause describes a state of affairs that is desirable from the hearer's point of view; (ii) it is within the hearer's power to bring about this state of affairs; (iii) the speaker has authority over the hearer" (Papafragou, 2000: 54) . In (59) and (60) The logical form of (61) In this context the customer's query about a change in the status of his account has made it mutually manifest that this change is desirable from his point of view and that the change is compatible with the student's preferences. "The only accessible domain of assumptions for which it would be relevant to know whether it is compatible with p involves the bank regulations" (p. 55), i.e. a factual domain. Thus, (61) can be paraphrased as (62) below: (62) In view of the bank regulations, our branch may convert your account into a student account.
MUST like may has an incomplete semantic content as it is unspecified with respect to the type of restrictor it admits in context. Suppose that the following sentence is uttered by Mary when she finds herself in a very cold room: In this context a sub-set of factual propositions functions as the restrictor of must which includes the factual assumptions concerning Mary's physical conditions and circumstances.
Imagine that Amy wants to become attractive and thinks the only way to achieve this is by losing weight. She then utters (64) According to Papafragou (2000: 61) , deontic readings arise in contexts in which the following assumptions are present: "(i) the modal restrictor contains a set consisting of the speaker's desires and factual assumptions; (ii) the speaker has authority over the hearer; (iii) the hearer is in a position to bring about the state of affairs described in the embedded proposition". Thus, the deontic utterances by must communicate that the proposition is entailed by a set of factual assumptions consisting the speaker's desires or set of regulatory propositions.
Sentences (67), (68) and (69) below indicate the "quasi-imperative suggestions/offers" by must:
(67) We must go for a walk. Such readings arise in contexts in which the following assumptions are mutually manifest: "(i) the embedded proposition p represents a state of affairs which is manifestly desirable to the hearer from his point of view as well as beneficial to him; (ii) the speaker has the responsibility for bringing about the state of affairs described in p; (iii) the speaker manifestly lacks any obligation to bring about this state of affairs" (Papafragou 2000: 54) . In such contexts must basically conveys that bringing about the state of affairs described by p "is entailed by the appropriate sub-set of the speaker' desires" (p. 62).
SHOULD encodes a complete but vague semantic representation; it expresses necessity relative to the propositions concerning the existing stereotypes and norms or the normative domains. Imagine that the sentence given as (70) below is exchanged between two people (e.g. two university students or two friends) who live in or share the same flat. One of these people does not help with cleaning that place, leaving it all to be done by the other. According to what is the normal or the right course of events, two people who live in the same place are equally responsible for keeping it. Given the type of modal restrictor that should semantically encodes, i.e. the normative domain, the speaker of (70) can successfully communicate this idea using this sentence: 
The pragmatics of epistemic modality
It was explained that epistemic modal interpretations on Papafragou's model involve the interpretive use of propositions. In different terms, epistemic modal operators take scope over metarepresentations, which are propositional forms used interpretively, and convey that they are compatible with/entailed by the sets of assumptions in the semantically and/or pragmatically (relevance-theoretically) recoverable epistemic domain of the speaker or the speaker's belief domain. In the different modal utterances exemplified below it will be shown how the semantic inputs of different English modal verbs are pragmatically processed, i.e. enriched or completed, to yield the epistemic interpretations that these verbs receive in different contexts.
Consider MAY in (73) below:
(73) Brian's resignation may prove a big mistake. (Papafragou, 2000: 72) Here once more the the incomplete semantic content of may must appeal to contextual assumptions for completion. In producing the above utterance the context is such that it can give rise to an epistemic interpretation. The speaker of this utterance is not in a position to take into account every factual assumption that could determine the truth of the proposition p[Brian's resignation proves a big mistake]. This is because p involves a future event and "the speaker cannot trust the background assumptions she uses to evaluate p to accurately and fully match state of affairs in the future" (Papafragou 2000: 72) . Thus, in this context (73) corresponds to the logical form given as (73') below (where Dbel refers to the set of speakers beliefs): The mutually manifest contextual assumptions in the case of (74) above can give rise to an epistemic interpretation. The proposition is actually describing a past situation, an event which either has or has not taken place in the past and therefore it has a determinate truth value at the present but since "the speaker lacks complete knowledge of what happened at the relevant time-slot in the past (i.e. during the burglary)" (p. 72) all she can do is "to reason on the basis of incomplete and partlysupported evidence which she reconstructs from both general-encyclopedic and situation-specific information about burglaries (e.g. that the burglars have used one of the usual methods of getting into the house, that they were exposed at least some of the time, that the neighbors pay some attention to what takes place in nearby properties, etc.)" (p. 72). Thus the logical form of (74) SHOULD in its epistemic uses is relativized to the set of the stereotypical beliefs of the speaker. For example, the speaker of (75) below utters this sentence when she has called the plumber and expects him to arrive after some time: These examples demonstrate that Papafragou's model, as she points out, can account for the categorizable and uncategorizable cases which have been recognized by ambiguity/polysemy approaches in a unified and systematic way and thus does not suffer from the inadequacies of such treatments:
The main original contribution of the study lies with the contention that the metarepresentation hypothesis, together with minimalistic semantic assumptions and independently motivated pragmatic considerations, offers a way of handling a broad and diverse range of previously unrelated and puzzling facts and is therefore preferable over previous accounts of modality. (Papafragou 2000: 8) Jalal Rahimian & Zohreh Vahedi The Semantic-Pragmatic Analysis of Persian Modal Verbs Based on Papafragou's Model 94
The power of this model compared to previous ambiguity/polysemy-based treatments basically lies in its logical and psychological plausibility. In fact this model provides us with a psychologically exact mechanism which can lead us to the pragmatic determination of the exact senses of the modals in particular contexts on the basis of the basic logical sense assigned to each modal verb semantically. Context as "a psychological construct [which] includes a subset of the speaker's assumptions about the world" (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 15) plays a very important role in providing each modal verb with its exact sense. In other words, in contrast to ambiguity/polysemy models which at best provide a (range of) vague sense(s) in terms of a number of defined labels (e.g. deontic possibility or epistemic necessity), on this account we are able to calculate or recover exactly what the verb specifies in terms of the pragmatically available sets and subsets of assumptions in the context of use and the basic meanings predicted by the semantics. Also on this model there is a very clear explanation for the difference between the basic subtypes of modality (epistemic/root -deontic and dynamic) in terms of the two basic uses of propositions, i.e. descriptive and interpretive as introduced by Sperber & Wilson (1995) in relevance theory. What is more, semantic parsimony represents another advantage of this model: why a long list of distinct senses, including the categorizable and uncategorizable uses of the modals should be encoded in the semantic entry of these words while it is completely possible for human mind to determine them exactly during online pragmatic processes in different contexts based a single unitary meaning representing the core concept that underdetermines the different uses. Finally, this model by providing a truly descriptive and explanatory account actually succeeds in accommodating all the categorizable and uncategorizable uses of modals in a unified and systematic way. In short then, logical and psychological plausibility, accuracy, systematicity of characterization and economy are among the most important advantages of this model over ambiguity/polysemy accounts. 6.1 (2010 6.1 ( ): 67-116 DOI: 10.2478 3. Persian modal verbs: a semantic-pragmatic analysis
Lodz Papers in Pragmatics
In this part the results of the application of Papafragou's (1998 Papafragou's ( , 2000 relevancetheoretic semantic-pragmatic model to Persian modal verbs will be presented and discussed in three parts: first, the semantics of Persian modals will be offered; in the second part, the pragmatics of root modality and in the third part, the pragmatics of epistemic modality will be discussed and exemplified.
A semantic proposal
Following Papafragou (1998 Papafragou ( , 2000 , mi-šav-ad, mi-šod-Ø and mi-šod-e are considered to encode incomplete semantic representations: they contain in their conceptual entries a gap or slot; they are unspecified with respect to the type of propositional domain they can admit contextually. As a result, like English must and may, these verbs "require the pragmatic saturation of an unspecified semantics" (Papafragou 2000: 43) to fill in or complete the "empty slot in their lexical semantics" (p. 43) and to yield the specific interpretations of modal verbs in different contexts as well as the truth-evaluable representations expressed by modal utterances. In other words, bâyad, mi-šav-ad, mi-šod-Ø and mi-šod- e are analyzed as cases of "domain selection". On the other hand, be-šav-ad, be-tavân and mi-tavân are considered to encode 'complete but vague' semantic contents: they are specified with respect to the type of propositional domains they can accept. As a result, like English can and should, these verbs "may require contextual enrichment or narrowing down in order to convey a more specific concept" (p. 14) in different contexts. In other words, be-šav-ad, be-tavân and mi-tavân are analyzed as cases of "domain restriction". In the next section, it will be demonstrated how the proposed semantics, the metarepresentation hypothesis and the pragmatic (relevancetheoretic) considerations will interact to yield the specific modal interpretations in different contexts.
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The Pragmatics of root modality
As discussed before, root modalities operate over propositional forms used descriptively: in root modal meanings the proposition embedded under the modal is an instance of the descriptive use of propositions rather than a second-order representation or a metarepresentation. In other words, the proposition in root modal meanings is taken to be a direct description of an actual or alternative (e.g. normative, ideal or desirable) state of affairs in the external world. According to Papafragou, what the root modality actually conveys is that this descriptive propositional form bears a certain logical relation (compatibility/entailment) to the set of propositions in various factual/nonfactual domains. During the comprehension process of root modal meanings the specific background assumptions in different propositional (sub)domains are pragmatically recovered based on the principle of relevance: the recovered modal restrictor "has to contribute to an interpretation of the utterance which is accessible enough for the hearer, and capable of achieving adequate cognitive effects in a way compatible with the speaker's abilities and preferences (i.e. an optimally relevant interpretation)" (Papafragou, 2000: 49) . Below the pragmatics of root modal meanings as expressed by Persian modal verbs will be exemplified and discussed.
Derivation of root interpretations
Based on the proposed semantics for Persian modal verbs, MITAVÂN, like can in English, encodes a complete semantic content: it only admits factual domains as its restrictor. But it may only be vague semantically and, therefore, it may be dependent on the pragmatic process of free enrichment to contextually narrow down its restrictor "so as to pick out [a more specific] sub-domain of factual assumptions" (Papafragou, 2000: 48) .
Consider (77) foreign countries and signing contracts with them in the oil sector, (77) will be paraphrased as: (78) In view of the effects of foreign assistance on the oil sector, the oil industry can be improved.
If the interlocutors are rather discussing the native scientific and practical capabilities of the country itself and the way it can be used to improve the oil sector, (77) can be paraphrased as (79) or (80) below:
(79) In view of having an efficient and expert workforce, the oil industry can be improved. (80) In view of the recent technological advances in the country, the oil industry can be improved.
It seems that mi-tavân cannot be used in genuine subjective deontic senses; unlike mi-šav-ad, it cannot be used in contexts in which the following assumptions are mutually manifest: "(i) the proposition p expressed by the embedded clause describes a state of affairs that is desirable from the hearer's point of view; (ii) it is within the hearer's power to bring about this state of affairs; (iii) the speaker has authority over the hearer" (Papafragou 2000: 54) . It seems to be reporting external rules and regulations or to be merely expressing a neutral dynamic possibility in the existing circumstances given that it is only used in formal impersonal structures. To use Papafragou's words, it seems to be activating different factual and regulatory domains rather than the domain of the speaker's preferences. Consider the following examples: In (81), (82) and (83), it is a factual regulatory domain (i.e. library rules, hospital rules and social rules respectively) with which the proposition expressed by the modal utterance is considered to be compatible. In (84), external circumstances (the number of pages of the book, the level of difficulty of the book, the reader's ability, etc.) are such that make finishing the book within two hours dynamically possible.
Mi-tavân cab be seen as expressing "suggestion" where the following assumptions are available to the speaker and hearer: "(i) the embedded proposition p represents a state of affairs which is manifestly desirable to the hearer from his point of view as well as beneficial to him; (ii) the speaker has the responsibility for bringing about the state of affairs described in p; (iii) the speaker manifestly lacks any obligation to bring about this state of affairs" (Papafragou 2000: 54) . Suppose that sentence (85) below is uttered by a teacher to the students of a class who were supposed to take an exam on that day but for some reason they have not been able to prepare themselves. The modal verb MIšAVAD has both root and epistemic uses because both descriptive and interpretive propositions (metarepresentations) can be embedded under this modal verb. Therefore it will be analyzed as an incomplete lexical item, with a gap in its semantic representation concerning the type of modal restrictor or propositional domain it admits in different contexts. In other words, like the English may, the semantic representation of this verb "remain[s] silent as to the type of the admissible restrictor [i.e. factual/nonfactual or epistemic], thereby leaving its specification entirely up to pragmatic processing" (Papafragou 2000: 41) . Consider example (87) and its logical form (87') and the way it pragmatically takes its restrictor from the context: (87) Imagine that the above utterance is a response from a person in charge of the graduation ceremony to a group of students who like all their family members to attend their graduation ceremony and ask whether this is possible. In this context, the only relevant domain of propositions for which it is necessary to know whether it is compatible with the wish of the students is the domain of the rules of the university. The speaker of the above utterance has this domain in mind and tries to convince the students that they cannot bring all their family members to the ceremony because it is against the rules. Thus, it is a sub-domain of factual assumptions or a regulatory domain that is recovered in the context of the above utterance as the restrictor of the modal verb. Therefore the above utterance can be paraphrased as (88) below:
(88) In view of the university rules, you may bring only one person with you to the graduation ceremony.
Mi-šav-ad can be used deontically to give permission. Imagine that the following sentence is uttered by a little girl to another one who has forgotten to bring her color-pencils with her to the class: that is desirable from the hearer's point of view" (the hearer likes to use her friend's color-pencils); (ii) "it is within the hearer's power to bring about this state of affairs" (the speaker is able to give her color-pencils to her friend); (iii) "the speaker has authority over the hearer" (the speaker is the owner of the colorpencils). Here mi-šav-ad shows a compatibility relation between the proposition p[You use my color-pencils] and a set of factual assumptions, including the speaker's preferences. Consider the oddity of mi-tavân in such contexts:
(90) mi-tavân ?az medâd rangi-hâ-ye man ?estefâde kard IMPF-CAN.NPS from pencil color-PL-LINK I using do.PS One can use my color-pencils (My color-pencils can be used)
Mi-tavân in the above utterance is more probably expressing a circumstantial neutral possibility and/or a formally stated offer or suggestion rather than giving permission to one particular individual to use one's color pencils. Persian speakers rarely, if ever, give permission to other people to use their personal belongings using mi-tavân. When the necessary background assumption for deontic readings mentioned above are present, mi-šav-ad is generally used. The subjective deontic use of this verb is enhanced by the personal inflected structure in which mi-šav-ad can occur while mi-tavân can only be used in impersonal structures (structures in which the main verb has not been inflected for person and number, rather the main verb is in the form of a short infinitive) and formal contexts. Consider (91) Here again it seems that the genuine deontic reading is obscured to some extent due to the impersonal structure and the modal can be seen as expressing an offer and/or a neutral circumstantial possibility depending on the context. It might be said that the personal involvement necessary for subjective deontic readings is decreased if the modal is used with impersonal structures as in (92) and (93) (95) In view of the present economic situation of the country inflation can be checked.
As suggested above, mi-šav-ad can express "suggestion" or "offer". In this usage it is very similar to mi-tav-ân but in contrast to this verb, it is informal especially when used with personal or inflected structures: The modal verb MIŠOD has both root and epistemic uses as both descriptive and interpretive propositions (metarepresentations) can be embedded under this modal verb. So it will be analyzed as an incomplete lexical item, with a gap in its semantic representation concerning the type of modal restrictor or propositional domain it admits in different contexts. To put it differently, like the English may, the semantic representation of this verb "remain[s] silent as to the type of the admissible restrictor [i.e. factual/nonfactual or epistemic], thereby leaving its specification entirely up to pragmatic processing" (Papafragou 2000: 41) . In the following example, which represents a root example, this verb admits the domain of factual assumptions as its restrictor. Consider (98) as an utterance exchanged between two students who have just finished taking a test and are talking about it:
(98) mi-šod-Ø xeili râhat taqallob kard IMPF-MAY.PS-3SG very easily cheating do.PS One could easily cheat (It was perfectly possible to cheat)
